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INCREASED USAGE OF CASH RENT: FACTORS INFLUENCING ILLINOIS FARMLAND 





In recent decades, cash rent leases have become increasingly popular amongst farm 
landowners in Illinois. Since 1995, a 44 percent rise has been seen in cash rent lease usage in 
Northern Illinois, a 105 percent increase in Southern Illinois, and a 117 percent increase in 
Central Illinois for acres enrolled in the Illinois Farm Business Farm Management Association. 
The rise in cash rent lease usage has been attributed to many factors such as crop yields, 
commodity prices, commodity payments, and crop insurance. This study aims to examine the 
potential factors driving the shift in use of cash rent leases in Illinois. Using data from the USDA 
National Agricultural Statistics Service (USDA-NASS), the Environmental Working Group 
(EWG), and University of Illinois farmdoc, factors influencing cash rent leases in Illinois were 
examined. Data was collected from all 102 counties in Illinois over a 21-year period. 
Comparisons were made across three regions in Illinois (Northern, Central, and Southern) using 
a fixed effects regression model. Results indicate that crop insurance payments (p < 0.001), corn 
price (p < 0.05), soybean price (p < 0.05), corn revenue (p < 0.05), soybean revenue (p < 0.05), 
and commodity payments (p < 0.05) have all influenced the increasing use of cash rent leases in 
Illinois. Corn and soybean yield were found to have no influence on increasing cash rent usage in 
Illinois. While only 5,500 Illinois farms were examined in this study, the findings can be viewed 
as a starting point for why the usage of cash rent leases are increasing in Illinois. With 
agriculture consistently changing, any variations that occur to the variables examined in this 
study could potentially have major ramifications on the leasing market in the years to come.  
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CHAPTER I: GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
This research study aims to better understand why cash rent leases have been increasingly 
used in recent years in Illinois. From 1995 to 2015, cash rent usage saw an increase from 41 to 
59 percent (a 44 percent rise) in Northern Illinois, 20 to 41 percent (a 105 percent rise) in 
Southern Illinois, and 18 to 39 percent (a 117 percent rise) in Central Illinois, among farms 
enrolled in the Illinois Farm Business Farm Management Association (FBFM) (Lattz, 2016; 
Lattz and Zwilling, 2020; Schnitkey, 2002; Zwilling, Krapf, and Raab, 2013). Following trends 
toward more cash rent lease usage, cash rent prices have also been increasing. In Illinois, from 
1987 to 2014, cash rent prices increased, on average, 3.6 percent annually. Since 2006, cash rent 
prices have increased annually by 7.4 percent (Schnitkey, 2017a). 
A high proportion of Illinois farmland falls under rental agreements. According to the 
2017 Census of Agriculture, just over 58 percent of farmland in Illinois was leased, while nearly 
42 percent was owner-operated. Nationally, it was found that 39 percent of all farmland acres in 
the U.S. were rented, with the remaining 61 percent being owner operated (USDA-NASS, 2017). 
Bigelow, Borchers, and Hubbs (2016) found that of the 911 million acres of farmland currently 
being used in the contiguous 48 states, nearly thirty-nine percent of that farmland was being 
rented. Twenty percent of the rented land, or 70 million acres, was found to be rented by 
“operator landlords” (Bigelow, Borchers, and Hubbs, 2016, p. iii). These are landowners who 
currently farm but also rent out a portion of their land. The other eighty percent of rented land, or 
283 million acres, came from landowners who do not participate in farming. Bigelow, Borchers, 
and Hubbs (2016) found that over seventy percent of the rented acres in the survey used a fixed-
cash rent agreement.  
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Absentee landowners play a large role in cash rent lease usage. For the purposes of this 
study, absentee landowners are defined as landowners who do not permanently live on the 
property that they own (Petrzelka, 2012; Petrzelka and Armstrong, 2015). Absentee 
landownership has been increasing in recent years, and it has been observed that absentee 
landowners are more likely to try use cash rent leases to provide stable returns (Barry et al., 
2000). Using cash rent leases to provide consistent returns is a way to mitigate risk in contract 
selection. Share rent contracts have a greater income risk for landowners, due to possible 
changes in crop yields and the potential of negative returns, which is different from cash rent 
contracts (Harwood et al., 1999). Cash rent contracts guarantee a set income per acre, making 
them inherently less risky for landowners.  
The purpose of this study is to better understand the factors that potentially affect usage 
of cash rent leases in Illinois in recent decades. Because of the challenges these trends can 
present to farm operators, it is important to understand why cash rent usage has increased at the 
same time that per-acre cash rent prices have also increased. Seeing a significant rise in cash rent 
lease usage becomes a problem especially when coupled with lowering farm incomes because 
farmers may not be able to afford to pay such high prices for land rental. When cash rent prices 
increase, it becomes even more challenging for farmers to earn positive returns on cash rented 
land. With farmland being a finite resource, trending towards more cash rent lease usage 
becomes an issue, especially when farmers who cash rent their land earn negative returns on 
those acres. Cash rent returns have been trending downward since 2011, with negative returns 
being experienced in 2014, 2015, and 2017. Slightly positive returns were seen in 2016 due to 
higher yields and high Agricultural Risk Coverage (ARC) payments (Schnitkey, 2017a; 
Schnitkey, 2017b). Determining which factors make the biggest impact on leases will also help 
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with identifying why cash rent leases are growing in popularity, helping both farmers and 
landowners understand these changes. This study identifies factors that may influence the shift 
towards cash rent leases and what can be done to help landowners and operators select contracts 
that will be mutually beneficial to both parties involved going forward.  
 
Thesis Organization 
 This thesis is an alternate format. It includes a general introduction, a manuscript 
formatted according to the Journal of the American Society of Farm Managers and Rural 




CHAPTER II: MANUSCRIPT 
Abstract 
In recent years, cash rent leases have become increasingly popular amongst farm 
landowners in Illinois. Since 1995, cash rent usage has increased 44%, 105%, and 117% in 
Northern, Southern, and Central Illinois, respectively for acres enrolled in FBFM. Using data 
from USDA-NASS, EWG, FBFM, and University of Illinois farmdoc, information on several 
variables was collected from all 102 counties in Illinois over a 21-year period to examine their 
impact on the leasing market. Results indicate crop insurance payments, corn price, soybean 
price, corn revenue, soybean revenue, and commodity payments have influenced the increasing 
use of cash rent leases in Illinois. 
 
Introduction and Background  
Over the last two decades, Illinois has experienced a dramatic increase in the use of cash 
rent leases. From 1995 to 2015, cash rent usage saw an increase from 41 to 59 percent (a 44 
percent rise) in Northern Illinois, 20 to 41 percent (a 105 percent rise) in Southern Illinois, and 
18 to 39 percent (a 117 percent rise) in Central Illinois, among farms enrolled in FBFM (Lattz, 
2016; Lattz and Zwilling, 2020; Schnitkey, 2002; Zwilling, Krapf, and Raab, 2013). These three 
regions are illustrated in Figure 1, with their respective changes shown in Figures 2-4. Following 
the trend towards more cash rent lease usage, cash rent prices have also been increasing. In 
Illinois, from 1987 to 2014, cash rent prices increased, on average, 3.6 percent annually. Since 
2006, cash rent prices have increased by 7.4 percent annually (Schnitkey, 2017a).  
Based upon the 2017 Census of Agriculture, it was found that just over 58 percent of 
farmland in Illinois is leased, while nearly 42 percent is owner-operated. Nationally, it was found 
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that 39 percent of all farmland acres in the U.S. are rented, with the remaining 61 percent being 
owner operated (USDA-NASS, 2017). When you couple more rented acres than the national 
average with increasing cash rent usage and increasing cash rent prices, it brings to light an 
interesting question of why these changes are occurring. This study aims to identify the factors 
that may influence the shift towards cash rent leases being used in Illinois. 
 
Literature Review 
This study primarily focuses on cash rent leases while examining share rent leases as 
well. Typically, a cash rent lease payment will see the operator pay the landowner a set fee per 
acre. The operator will then furnish the cost of all inputs on their own. After the growing season 
concludes, the operator then receives all the crop produced on that rented land. On the other 
hand, share rent leases involve the landowner and operator splitting most of the input costs and 
the crop that is produced on the land. Input costs typically include things such as seed, fertilizer, 
and chemical costs. A 50/50 split is the most common crop share agreement in Illinois and 
selling the crop that is produced on the land is how both parties receive payment. (Lattz, 2017a; 
Lattz, n.d.) The date when farmland leases normally begin in Illinois is March 1st. Typically, any 
leases would then end on the last day of February of the following year. The generally accepted 
deadline to terminate or make changes to a lease is four months prior to the ending date of the 
lease. Most leases will automatically renew if nothing is done, so missing the deadline will allow 
the lease to remain the same for another year (Troendle, 2019).  
While limited research has been conducted on the increasing usage of cash rent leases in 
Illinois, there has been research done in related areas, mainly focused on land values and cash 
rent values. Previous studies have identified several factors that have been known to affect land 
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and cash rent values. These factors include corn and soybean prices, corn and soybean yields, 
government payments, and crop insurance payments amongst others.  
Understanding these factors and how they influence cash rent usage becomes especially 
relevant to agriculture in Illinois when you consider that the majority of farmland acres in the 
state are leased. According to the 2017 Census of Agriculture, just over 58 percent of farmland in 
Illinois is leased, and nearly 42 percent is owner-operated. Nationally, it was found that 39 
percent of all farmland acres in the U.S. are rented, with the remaining 61 percent being owner 
operated (USDA-NASS, 2017).  
To understand why lease trends are changing so much, we must understand what factors 
affect the land market. Helmers, Shaik, and Johnson (2005) found that cash crop receipts and 
government payments were consistent with income generated from professionally managed 
farmland, meaning that recent cash crop receipts and government payments were strongly 
considered when looking into anticipated level of return off of the rented land. However, cash 
receipts are generally uncertain due to changing markets and they only account for gross revenue 
and not the net revenue. Government payments also have uncertainty due to the nature of 
changes being made to farm programs. Recent returns from crop receipts and government 
payments that farmers have received play a major role in their expectations for the income they 
expect to earn in upcoming years and help them make their decisions going forward (Helmers, 
Shaik, and Johnson, 2005).  
Choosing between different types of leasing contracts also has an effect on changes in 
income levels received in Illinois. With a crop share lease there is a level of protection against 
revenue loss, but when using a cash rent lease, the loss risk is higher because it cannot be 
covered entirely by crop insurance (Paulson, Schnitkey, and Sherrick, 2010). It was also noted 
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that when utilizing a cash rent lease, as the price per acre of the lease increases, the greater the 
risk of lost income is for the operator. When farms use more cash rent lease at higher prices, they 
become much more likely to experience losses in income (Paulson, 2012).  
Sotomayor, Ellinger, and Barry (2000) conducted a survey of Illinois grain farmers that 
resulted in details on 1,224 leases. Using a probit estimation and a least squares regression, they 
identified factors affecting the cash rent versus crop share contract choice and the expected level 
of cash rent prices. It was observed that changes in revenue, soil productivity, tract size, non-
farm income, length of business relationship between landowner and operator, debt-to-asset 
ratio, net worth, and number of landowners on one farm were all significant in choosing between 
a cash rent and crop share contract. The variables that were found to affect cash rent prices 
include soil productivity, tract size, and net worth.   
 There is also a possible connection between cash rent values and actual land values. 
Ibendahl and Griffin (2013) looked at whether cash rent prices or land prices were the 
determining factor in setting the market prices for both. They found that cash rent prices will 
follow land prices pretty steadily until land prices start to drop, in which case cash rent prices do 
not drop at the same rate. Some thoughts as to why this occurs are tenants have a large impact on 
changes in cash rent prices. Tenants can affect cash rent prices by both helping slow down 
increases and helping drops in price occur faster. It was also noted that other pressures being 
placed on land values have an effect on the changes that occur between land and cash rent prices 
(Ibendahl and Griffin, 2013).  
Zhang, Zhang, and Hart (2018) examined how industry professionals’ thoughts on future 
commodity prices affects their predictions of future farmland values. The study surveyed farm 
managers, real estate brokers, rural appraisers and others attending the Soil Management and 
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Land Valuation (SMLV) conference at Iowa State University to capture their perspectives on 
future land and commodity prices. They concluded that crop price changes and expected land 
value changes correlate with each other. The correlation was the strongest in the medium-term 
land forecast. They found that a one percent increase in corn prices would result in a 0.2 percent 
increase in land prices in the short term (2016-2017), while a 0.4 percent increase could be 
expected in medium-to-long-term land forecasts. It was also found that the correlation was 
stronger between soybean price changes and land price changes than between changes in corn 
prices and changes in land prices. This could be attributed to the increase in soybean acres during 
the time of the study (Zhang, Zhang, and Hart, 2018).  
Du, Hennessy, and Edwards (2007) found that for every dollar increase in corn price, 
cash rents in Iowa were expected to go up by seventy-nine dollars per acre in the short run, and 
between $109-$114 per acre in the long run. The long run change in price was found to take 
around four years. This study was conducted using data from 1987 to 2005.  
How much money is received through government payments and which programs the 
money comes from can also affect cash rent rates. Roberts, Kirwan, and Hopkins (2003) used 
data from the 1992 and 1997 Census of Agriculture to find that for every dollar of government 
payment, land rental prices increased by 34 to 41 cents in nine regions across the country, 
including the Northern Great Plains and Heartland, which contains Illinois. Lence and Mishra 
(2003) found that for each dollar of market assistance and production flexibility contracts that 
was paid out in Iowa from 1996 to 2000, cash rent prices would increase by 86 cents per acre. 
Goodwin, Mishra, and Ortalo-Magné (2004) used data from the National Agricultural Statistics 
Service Agricultural Resource Management Survey to gather payment data from different farm 
programs across the country from 1998 to 2001. The study discovered that for every dollar of 
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loan deficiency payments (LDP), a 57-cent rise in cash rent prices would occur. Lambert and 
Griffin (2004) examined the changes that LDPs had on cash rent prices in Illinois from 1996-
2001. The study found that no changes in cash rent prices were due to LDPs.  
Policy changes have implications on both the owner and the operator, as well as on 
payment types. While the operator may benefit directly from government payments by receiving 
the money, it also allows for landowners to increase the price of cash rents. Land prices were 
found to be higher when payments were issued than if no government assistance was given to 
farmers (USDA-ERS, 2001). For every dollar of marginal subsidies that are paid out, a 20 to 25 
cent increase in rental rates can be expected (Kirwan, 2009). Since government payments 
contribute to income, they help boost farmland value in situations where the land has 
government payments that are associated with it. Placing land into conservation programs to 
receive payments can draw land out of production, which can lead to increased rental prices on 
land still in production (Ryan et al., 2001).   
However, different types of leases can lead to different ways that government payments 
are received by both the landowner and the operator. Much of this has to do with who is 
“actively engaged in farming.” Being actively engaged in farming requires an individual to 
provide “significant contributions to the farming operation” (USDA FSA, 2015, p. 1). These 
contributions include things like farmland, labor, management or equipment (USDA FSA, 2015). 
When a cash rent lease is used, the operator will receive all of the government payments for that 
piece of land (Lattz, 2017a). When using a crop share lease, the landowner and the operator will 




This study used sources including USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service 
(NASS), Illinois Farm Business Farm Management Association (FBFM), University of Illinois 
farmdoc, and the Environmental Working Group (EWG) to collect secondary data on the 
potential factors affecting cash rent usage in Illinois. Land tenure data, which includes percent 
usage of cash rent leases, share rent leases, and owner-operated acres, was collected from 
farmdoc (University of Illinois) utilizing FBFM data. This data is representative of farms 
enrolled in FBFM, which currently includes more than 5,500 Illinois farms (Lattz and Zwilling, 
2020). FBFM provides “a cooperative educational-service program designed to assist farmers 
with management decision-making” (Illinois FBFM, n.d.). All farms used in this data set are 260 
acres or more and receive most of their income from grain farming. While this does not include 
all Illinois farms, it does provide a good framework for land tenure in the state (Lattz and 
Zwilling, 2020). Cash rent usage percentage was collected from 1995-2015 and categorized by 
region. The regions include the Northern, Central, and Southern portions of the state, based upon 
the standard regions that farmdoc uses in reporting their data (Figure 1). The explanatory factors 
that were used in this study include commodity prices and crop yields for both corn and soybeans 
(USDA-NASS) (Table 1), government payments in the form of commodity subsidies (Table 2), 
and crop insurance subsidies (EWG) (Table 3). With the exception of commodity prices, all 
factors were collected from each county in Illinois from 1995-2015. Commodity prices were 
collected from University of Illinois farmdoc and reflect the yearly average price that was 
received throughout Illinois for each individual year observed in the study.  
After gathering the crop yield data on corn from USDA-NASS, each individual county 
was placed into the corresponding region that aligned with how the land tenure data was 
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organized. There are twenty-two counties in the Northern region, forty-four in the Central region, 
and thirty-six in the Southern region. Subsequently, an average yield was found for every year in 
each region (1995-2015) to give one corn yield in each region for every year. Identical steps 
were followed to amass and average the data for soybean yields, commodity subsidies, and crop 




To find the relationship between each factor and increasing cash rent usage, a fixed effect 
regression analysis was conducted. For the purpose of this study, the dependent variable is the 
percent of cash rent usage. The explanatory variables are commodity prices, crop yields, 
commodity payments, and crop insurance payments. The data set includes two types of variation, 
between-region and within-region variation. Between-region variation comes from comparing 
the percent of cash rent usage across the three regions in a given year. Within-region variation is 
generated by the effect of the explanatory variables on cash rent usage within each region over 
time (Greene, 2003). Because unobservable factors not captured in the data could impact both 
the dependent and independent variables, meaning that any variables not used in the study could 
affect the data, there may be omitted variable bias present if a simple linear regression were run 
on the data (Greene, 2003). Dummy variables were made for each of the regions. Utilizing 
dummy variables allows for the Northern and Central regions to be compared to the Southern 
region, which is designated as the base region, and helps eliminate the effects of multicollinearity 
(Greene, 2003). Then, the differences that occur between the base region and the other regions 
can be observed without issue (Kennedy, 2003). One region must be used as the base region to 
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avoid the “dummy variable trap,” which states that if every region has a dummy variable, perfect 
multicollinearity would exist and the test would fail (Greene, 2003. p. 118)    
The analysis was conducted with IBM SPSS Version 24, using the GLM (generate linear 
model) function with the univariate option to run the fixed effects regression model. There were 
four different ways that the model was run based upon work done by Lambert and Griffin 
(2004). The first model (Equation 1) used all the original variables that were stated above. The 
second model (Equation 2) utilized revenue for both corn and soybeans, instead of yields and 
prices separately. This was done to see the combined effect that prices and yields had on cash 
rent usage. Each crop’s revenue was found by multiplying its yield by its price for each year. The 
third model (Equation 3) used all the original variables, but the explanatory variables were 
lagged behind by one year. This was done because of potential timing issues that can occur with 
the explanatory variables, specifically regarding when they are received. For example, if 
commodity payments are received for something that occurred in 1995, the revenue from those 
payments may not be received until the following year. Similar situations can occur with the 
other variables as well, so lagging the payments allows for their effects to be felt in the correct 
year. Instead of starting with 1995, that cash rent usage percentage started with 1996 and 
continued until 2015. This allowed for 2015 to be removed from the explanatory variables, as it 
was no longer necessary because of the lag. Finally, the fourth rendition of the model (Equation 
4) utilized revenues instead of yield and price again and all of the variables were still lagged in 
the same way as model three. For each of the models, the Southern region is used as the base, 
meaning that the Northern and Central regions will be compared to the Southern region 
throughout the models. 
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Models 
In each model, the dependent variable 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 represents the cash rent percentage in region i 
in year t where: 
i = 1, 2, 3 (1 = northern, 2 = central, and 3 = southern) 
t = 1, … 21 (1 = 1995…21 = 2015)  
 
Model 1:    
 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑆𝑜𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑆𝑜𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 
 𝛽𝑆𝑜𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑆𝑜𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +  
 𝛽𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑛 + 𝛽𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑈𝑖𝑡 (1) 
                                                                                                                  
CornYield and SoybeanYield represent the average corn and soybean yields, respectively, 
measured in bushels per acre for region i in year t.  CornPrice and SoybeanPrice are the average 
per-bushel price for each crop in year t.  CommodityPayments and CropInsurance represent the 
average amount of commodity payments and crop insurance subsidies received per county in 
region i in year t. Northern and Central denoted the dummy variables that were created. In 
addition, ci measures the unobservable factors that are not measured in the study; and uit 
represents the error that could occur across regions or time (Lambert and Griffin, 2004).  
 
Model 2: 
 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑆𝑜𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑆𝑜𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 
 𝛽𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 
 𝛽𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑛 + 𝛽𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑈𝑖𝑡 (2) 
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Model 2 possesses the same variables as the Model 1, except CornRevenue and 
SoybeanRevenue were created by combining the price and yield variables of each crop. This was 
done by multiplying the price and yield of each crop together in each year (CornPrice*CornYield 
and SoybeanPrice*SoybeanYield). The newly created revenue variables reflect the average 
revenue received for each crop in region i in year t. 
 
Model 3: 
 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡-1 + 𝛽𝑆𝑜𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑆𝑜𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡-1 + 𝛽𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡-1 
+ 𝛽𝑆𝑜𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑆𝑜𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡-1 + 𝛽𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡-1 +  
 𝛽𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡-1 + 𝛽𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑛 + 𝛽𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑈𝑖𝑡 (3) 
                                                                                                                                                                                                               
For Model 3, the variables remained the same as in Model 1. However, Model 3 utilized 
a one-year lag for each of the explanatory variables. Simply put, this means that the explanatory 
variables will always be one year behind cash rent usage, the dependent variable. For example, 
the 1995 variables were measured against 1996 cash rent usage and so on until 2015. This is 
denoted by the superscript t-1 with each of the explanatory variables.  
 
Model 4: 
 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡-1 + 𝛽𝑆𝑜𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑆𝑜𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡-1 + 
 𝛽𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡-1 + 𝛽𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡-1 + 
 𝛽𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑛 + 𝛽𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑈𝑖𝑡 (4) 
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This model, similar to Model 3, utilizes lagged explanatory variables and includes the 
CornRevenue and SoybeanRevenue instead of price and yield separately. 
 
Results 
Tables 5 through 8 provide descriptive statistics of the data. Each table includes the 
minimum, maximum, mean, and standard deviation of both the explanatory variables and the 
cash rent usage percentage. Table 5 shows the statistics for all of Illinois, while the following 
tables show the Northern (Table 6), Central (Table 7), and Southern (Table 8) regions separately. 
It is noted that the Central region had the highest averages for each of the explanatory variables, 
while the Northern region averaged the highest percentage of cash rent usage. Tables 9 through 
12 depict the results for each of the individual models. A more in-depth discussion of the model 
results is included below.  
 
Model 1 
Model 1 produced an R2 of 0.942, meaning that ninety-four percent of the variation in 
cash rent usage is explained by the variation of the explanatory factors used in the model. It was 
noted that crop insurance payments (p < 0.001), corn price (p <0.05), and soybean price (p < 
0.05) were all significant predictors of the use of cash rent leases. The results of the model 
suggest that a $10,000 increase in crop insurance payments will lead to a 0.042 percent increase 
in cash rent usage. To put this into better context, for every $250,000 increase in per-county crop 
insurance payments within a region, it can be expected that a one percent increase in cash rent 
usage will occur in that region. Since the average annual per-county crop insurance payment was 
$2,180,966.16, seeing swings of $250,000 or more could happen frequently. Therefore, it is 
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reasonable to expect that crop insurance payments could have a large effect on the increased 
usage of cash rent lease in Illinois.  
The results show that a negative relationship exists between the corn price and cash rent 
usage. It was found that a one dollar increase in price will result in a drop in cash rent usage of 
just over three percent. Since smaller price changes occur more frequently with both corn and 
soybean prices, it is more reasonable to examine the impact of these small price changes. For 
every $0.25 increase in corn price, a decrease in cash rent usage of 0.78 percent can be expected. 
Soybean prices were also found to be significant (p < 0.05). The results show that a positive 
relationship exists between soybean price and cash rent usage, with a one dollar increase in 
soybean prices resulting in a 1.29 percent increase in cash rent usage. Subsequently, a $0.25 
increase in soybean prices will lead to a 0.32 percent increase in cash rent usage. Commodity 
payments (p > 0.05), corn yield (p > 0.05) and soybean yield (p > 0.05) were found to be 
insignificant. It was also noted that the Northern region saw just over 16 percent more cash rent 
usage (β = 16.07) when compared to the Southern region. The Central region (β = -6.641) saw 
around 7 percent less cash rent usage compared to the Southern region. The complete results of 
Model 1 can be found in Table 9.  
 
Model 2 
This model produced an R2 of 0.934, meaning that 93 percent of the variation in cash rent 
usage is explained by the variation of the explanatory factors used in the model. Both corn and 
soybean revenues were found to be significant at a five percent level. Corn revenue (p < 0.05) 
was found to have a negative relationship, meaning a one dollar increase in corn revenue will 
lead to a 0.012 percent drop in cash rent usage. However, soybean revenue (p < 0.05) was found 
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to have a positive relationship, as a one dollar increase in soybean revenue will lead to a 0.017 
percent increase in cash rent usage. Crop insurance (p < 0.001) was significant at a five percent 
level, with the model suggesting that a $10,000 increase in crop insurance payments will lead to 
an increase in cash rent usage of 0.043 percent. Additionally, for every $250,000 increase of per-
county crop insurance payments, an increase of cash rent usage of just over 1 percent can be 
expected. Commodity payments were found to be insignificant (p > 0.05) in this model. The 
Northern region saw slightly under 17 percent more cash rent usage (β = 16.65) than the 
Southern region, while the Northern region was observed to have just over 6 percent less cash 
rent usage (β = -6.063). The complete results of Model 2 can be found in Table 6. 
 
Model 3 
 This model produced an R2 of 0.934, meaning that 93 percent of the variation in cash rent 
usage is explained by the variation of the explanatory factors used in the model. It was found that 
corn price, soybean price and crop insurance were all significant. However, corn yield (p > 0.05) 
soybean yield (p > 0.05) and commodity payments (p > 0.05) were not significant at a five 
percent level (α =0.05).  
 Crop insurance payments were found to be highly significant (p < 0.001). For every 
$10,000 increase in crop insurance payments, a 0.039 percent rise in cash rent lease use will 
occur. This also means that for every $250,000 that are paid out, cash rent usage will increase by 
one percent. Since the average amount of per-county crop insurance payments paid out per year 
is $2,180,966.16, seeing changes of over $250,000 could occur frequently. 
Corn price was found to be significant at a five percent level (p < 0.05) as well. However, 
it was found that the relationship between corn price and cash rent usage was negative. This 
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suggests that for every dollar increase in corn price, a drop of just over three percent in cash rent 
usage can be expected. With smaller price changes seen in both corn and soybean prices, it is 
reasonable to expect to see changes of around $0.25. In corn, if a price increase of $0.25 were to 
occur, a subsequent decrease of cash rent usage by 0.77 percent could be expected. Soybean 
prices (p < 0.05) had a positive relationship with cash rent usage, meaning that for every dollar 
increase in soybean price, a 1.3 percent rise in cash rent usage will occur in Illinois. If a $0.25 
increase in soybean price was to happen, a rise in cash rent usage of 0.34 percent can be 
expected. The Northern region was found to have around fifteen percent more cash rented land 
(β = 15.23) when compared to the Southern region, while the Central region has just over seven 
percent (β = -7.34) less cash rent usage. Table 11 shows the complete results of Model 3.  
 
Model 4  
 This model produced an R2 of 0.917, meaning that 92 percent of the variation in cash rent 
usage is explained by the variation of the explanatory factors used in the model. The results 
indicate that both commodity payments and (p < 0.05) crop insurance payments (p < 0.001) 
were significant. However, both corn (p > 0.05) and soybean revenue (p > 0.05) were 
insignificant at the five percent level. Crop insurance payments were found to have a positive 
relationship with cash rent usage. For every $10,000 increase in crop insurance payments, an 
increase in cash rent usage of 0.039 percent can be expected. Additionally, a $250,000 increase 
in per-county crop insurance payments will lead to an increase in cash rent usage of 1 percent.  
The positive relationship seen with commodity payments shows that a $10,000 increase 
in payments will lead to a 0.002 percent increase in cash rent lease usage. For every $500,000 of 
commodity payments paid out, a 1 percent rise is cash rent usage is expected to occur. This 
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becomes very plausible when you consider that there are major swings that occur every year in 
payment levels and that the average value of per-county government payments during this period 
was $7,155,047.62. The Northern region was found to have seen just under 16 percent (β = 
15.93) more cash rent usage when being compared to the Southern region, while the Central 
region had over 6 percent less (β = -6.60) cash rent usage. Table 12 shows the complete results 
of Model 4.  
 
Implications/Conclusions 
In recent decades, a major shift in land rental practices has been taking place throughout 
Illinois. Since 1995, cash rent lease usage has risen dramatically, with a 44 percent increase 
being seen in Northern Illinois, a 105 percent increase taking place in Southern Illinois, and a 
117 percent increase occurring in Central Illinois among farms enrolled in FBFM (Lattz, 2016; 
Lattz and Zwilling, 2020; Schnitkey, 2002; Zwilling, Krapf, and Raab, 2013). During that same 
period, cash rent prices have also been rising, by about 3.6 percent per year since 1987 
(Schnitkey, 2017a). The majority of farmland in the state falls under some variety of rental 
agreement, with 58 percent of the total farmland in the state being rented. Nationally, it was 
found that 39 percent of farmland acres were rented, which is much less than what is seen in 
Illinois (USDA-NASS, 2017). When you combine more rented acres than the national average, 
increasing cash rent usage, a lower amount of risk for a landowner when using a cash rent lease, 
increasing cash rent prices, and lower farm incomes, it brings to light an interesting question of 
why the use of cash rent lease are rising in popularity, and what exactly is driving this change.  
The results of this study found that crop insurance payments, corn price, soybean price, 
corn revenue, soybean revenue and commodity payments all influence cash rent lease usage in 
20 
Illinois. With prices, yields and payments levels continually changing, the effects of these 
changes are constantly being reflected in cash rent usage. Specifically, with crop insurance and 
commodity payments, seeing changes in payment structure or types could have a major effect on 
cash rent usage. In the case of the recently implemented Market Facilitation Program (MFP), 
changes in payment structure that lead to increases of over $250,000 per county could potentially 
lead to major increases in the use of cash rent leases. Similarly, changes in the structure or type 
of crop insurance payments could possibly lead to large increase in cash rent usage as well. 
Although there were only 5,500 Illinois farms examined in this study, the findings can be viewed 
as a starting point for why the usage of cash rent leases are increasing in Illinois.  With 
agriculture consistently changing, any variations that occur to the variables examined in this 
study could potentially have major ramifications on the leasing market in the years to come.  
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1:  Average Crop Yield and Commodity Prices Per Year 






















1995 114.59 43.75 116.30 40.95 92.03 31.15 2.61 5.96 
1996 131.23 38.82 143.48 43.23 106.39 34.13 3.71 7.41 
1997 132.23 45.89 134.27 44.76 100.33 35.40 2.70 7.55 
1998 153.86 50.48 142.02 46.06 109.97 34.51 2.30 6.05 
1999 142.09 46.00 145.36 44.80 105.56 30.31 1.97 4.68 
2000 141.68 41.00 157.52 46.18 135.00 38.92 1.90 4.81 
2001 144.36 44.45 156.75 46.86 139.97 39.81 1.94 4.53 
2002 136.00 43.00 143.75 48.18 83.61 29.36 2.19 5.05 
2003 160.50 32.09 174.59 40.64 118.17 34.92 2.29 6.14 
2004 175.00 48.41 186.00 52.34 158.72 44.58 2.51 7.51 
2005 129.73 44.00 147.68 48.30 129.39 41.69 2.04 6.02 
2006 171.00 50.45 163.89 50.14 131.97 41.39 2.36 5.75 
2007 179.86 49.64 182.91 47.80 131.39 30.06 3.41 7.97 
2008 178.70 45.35 182.02 49.05 153.32 42.88 4.78 11.66 
2009 164.41 45.70 178.57 49.70 153.91 39.56 3.70 10.29 
2010 170.09 53.96 153.40 54.20 140.36 42.25 3.85 10.14 
2011 173.22 57.35 156.49 50.25 129.09 37.54 6.12 12.79 
2012 128.57 47.36 112.10 46.56 42.83 32.71 6.72 14.25 
2013 180.05 53.66 180.24 52.80 162.53 42.75 6.12 14.24 
2014 188.47 57.19 209.43 57.82 179.48 48.92 4.17 12.53 
2015 184.55 57.40 177.90 58.57 155.20 48.16 3.73 9.67 
Data was collected from USDA-NASS and University of Illinois farmdoc.  
Table 1 reflects the average yield per county within each region for both corn and soybeans from 







Table 2:  Average Commodity Payments Received Per Year 
 
Northern Central Southern 
 
Commodity Payments 
1995 $    6,011,443.82 $    6,166,412.57 $  1,829,446.11 
1996 $    3,610,585.27 $    3,871,933.95 $  1,972,995.28 
1997 $    5,750,028.41 $    6,233,663.64 $  2,426,716.31 
1998 $    9,938,077.36 $  11,377,271.00 $  4,336,447.58 
1999 $  18,465,664.86 $  22,197,921.16 $  8,921,031.03 
2000 $  20,054,078.09 $  23,965,623.64 $  9,842,327.72 
2001 $  17,714,202.68 $  21,253,791.09 $  9,956,937.67 
2002 $    5,622,155.91 $    5,911,454.11 $  2,603,504.75 
2003 $    7,358,021.68 $    8,747,253.07 $  3,764,654.39 
2004 $  10,910,561.00 $  13,848,120.32 $  5,214,745.14 
2005 $  17,898,106.95 $  20,956,733.57 $  7,552,432.92 
2006 $    9,773,142.50 $  11,743,233.52 $  4,637,266.64 
2007 $    4,921,645.77 $    5,818,968.07 $  2,486,970.11 
2008 $    4,876,773.86 $    5,963,409.57 $  2,477,621.14 
2009 $    4,758,401.09 $    5,288,587.50 $  2,546,993.33 
2010 $    5,232,067.23 $    6,408,153.80 $  2,550,673.92 
2011 $    4,482,862.23 $    5,306,824.11 $  2,330,751.83 
2012 $    4,533,159.77 $    5,129,042.20 $  2,371,085.58 
2013 $    4,183,739.73 $    4,942,867.91 $  2,176,907.89 
2014 $          27,923.64 $          37,367.86 $        10,700.28 
2015 $    8,341,605.23 $    1,013,190.89 $      111,720.06 
Data was collected from the Environmental Working Group (EWG). 
Table 2 reflects the average amount of commodity payments that were received per county 









Table 3: Average Crop Insurance Payments Received Per Year 
 
Northern Central Southern 
 
Crop Insurance Payments 
1995 $      403,167.36 $      485,911.05 $      389,793.56 
1996 $      462,855.27 $      557,130.64 $      420,034.69 
1997 $      381,481.64 $      448,610.61 $      352,261.06 
1998 $      419,919.45 $      473,851.23 $      335,485.31 
1999 $      373,331.18 $      420,218.25 $      333,054.92 
2000 $      360,385.59 $      463,091.02 $      335,214.64 
2001 $      878,376.77 $  1,122,851.48 $      699,291.94 
2002 $      898,564.86 $  1,108,438.48 $      671,102.36 
2003 $  1,076,588.45 $  1,261,051.34 $      879,789.14 
2004 $  1,515,742.50 $  1,670,501.36 $  1,149,787.69 
2005 $  1,634,211.23 $  1,717,751.73 $  1,052,471.22 
2006 $  2,651,378.14 $  2,803,213.11 $  1,205,926.44 
2007 $  3,949,811.68 $  3,993,500.66 $  1,849,648.14 
2008 $  4,979,596.41 $  5,149,237.36 $  2,927,755.00 
2009 $  4,027,188.77 $  4,530,307.00 $  2,709,485.75 
2010 $  3,221,181.23 $  3,555,908.09 $  2,427,942.61 
2011 $  5,283,211.68 $  5,962,245.20 $  3,892,647.25 
2012 $  4,194,567.55 $  4,907,434.11 $  3,653,891.42 
2013 $  3,778,708.77 $  4,927,183.36 $  4,148,958.97 
2014 $  3,179,291.77 $  3,863,099.73 $  3,738,628.22 
2015 $  3,179,709.41 $  4,015,022.20 $  3,941,869.75 
Data was collected from the Environmental Working Group (EWG). 
Table 3 shows the average amount of government expenses from crop insurance per county 
within each region for each year from 1995-2015.
 
Data was collected from University of Illinois farmdoc. 
Table 4 shows the percentage use of cash rent leases, share rent leases, and owner-operated acres on farmland acres in Illinois. The 
percentages are shown in the Northern, Central, and Southern regions of the state, and cover a timeline spanning from 1995 to 2015.
Table 4: Farmland Tenure By Year 




















1995 41 42 17 18 68 14 20 58 22 
1996 37 41 22 17 68 15 20 53 27 
1997 38 41 21 18 67 15 22 51 27 
1998 40 39 21 18 67 16 20 54 26 
1999 43 36 21 20 66 14 22 52 26 
2000 43 36 21 21 65 14 22 53 25 
2001 45 33 22 23 63 14 22 53 25 
2002 45 33 22 24 62 14 24 51 24 
2003 48 30 22 26 59 15 28 49 23 
2004 49 29 22 29 56 15 27 50 22 
2005 53 30 17 30 56 14 34 47 19 
2006 53 28 18 32 55 13 34 47 20 
2007 54 28 18 34 53 13 37 43 20 
2008 54 28 18 35 52 13 36 44 20 
2009 55 27 18 35 52 13 36 44 20 
2010 57 26 18 33 53 14 38 42 20 
2011 57 25 18 36 51 14 40 40 20 
2012 58 23 19 37 49 14 38 41 21 
2013 58 22 20 37 49 14 37 42 21 
2014 58 21 21 39 47 14 39 37 24 






a. Crop prices are average per-bushel prices statewide, 1995-2015. 
  
Table 5. Descriptive Statistics of Illinois for all Counties, 1995-2015 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Cash Rent Usage (%) 17.00 59.00 36.24 12.27 
Corn Yield (bu/acre) 42.83 209.43 147.37 29.80 
Soybean Yield (bu/acre) 29.36 58.57 44.70 7.31 
Corn Price ($/bu)a 1.90 6.72 3.39 1.46 
Soybean Price ($/bu)a 4.53 14.25 8.33 3.18 
Corn Revenue ($/acre) 183.11 1103.07 503.54 251.04 
Soybean Revenue ($/acre) 141.85 764.12 381.01 178.51 
Commodity Payments (per $10,000) 1.07 2396.56 715.50 592.05 
 Crop Insurance (per $10,000) 33.31 596.22 218.10 170.15 
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Table 6. Descriptive Statistics of the Counties in the Northern Region, 1995-2015 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Cash Rent Usage (%)  37.00 59.00 49.76 7.39 
Corn Yield (bu/acre) 114.59 188.47 156.20 22.34 
Soybean Yield (bu/acre)  32.09 57.40 47.43 6.38 
Corn Price ($/bu)a 1.90 6.72 3.39 1.48 
Soybean Price ($/bu)a 4.53 14.25 8.33 3.23 
Commodity Payments (per $10,000) 2.79 2005.41 830.78 563.44 
Crop Insurance (per $10,000) 36.04 528.32 223.09 170.56 
Corn Revenue ($/acre) 264.65 1101.84 539.51 267.03 
Soybean Revenue ($/acre) 197.03 764.12 406.30 193.75 




Table 7. Descriptive Statistics of the Counties in the Central Region, 1995-2015 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Cash Rent Usage (%)  17.00 39.00 28.62 7.81 
Corn Yield (bu/acre) 112.10 209.43 159.27 24.07 
Soybean Yield (bu/acre)   40.64 58.57 48.53 4.76 
Corn Price ($/bu)a 1.90 6.72 3.39 1.48 
Soybean Price ($/bu)a 4.53 14.25 8.33 3.23 
Commodity Payments (per $10,000) 3.74 2396.56 934.20 709.26 
Crop Insurance (per $10,000) 42.02 596.22 254.46 191.90 
Corn Revenue ($/acre) 286.36 1103.07 541.92 251.35 
Soybean Revenue ($/acre) 209.66 751.87 412.02 183.12 






Table 8. Descriptive Statistics of the Counties in the Southern Region, 1995-2015 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Cash Rent Usage (%) 20.00 41.00 30.33 7.86 
Corn Yield (bu/acre) 42.83 179.48 126.63 31.51 
Soybean Yield (bu/acre) 29.36 48.92 38.14 5.82 
Corn Price ($/bu)a 1.90 6.72 3.39 1.48 
Soybean Price ($/bu)a 4.53 14.25 8.33 3.23 
Commodity Payments (per $10,000) 1.07 995.69 381.53 291.25 
Crop Insurance (per $10,000) 33.31 414.90 176.74 143.62 
Corn Revenue ($/acre) 183.11 994.68 429.18 228.41 
Soybean Revenue ($/acre) 141.85 612.97 324.70 150.67 






Southern Region is absent because it is used as the base. 
  
Table 9. Fixed Effects Regression Model 1  
Parameter B Std. Error t Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Intercept 18.907 4.070 4.645 .000 10.747 27.067 
Corn Yield (bu/acre) -.008 .025 -.336 .738 -.058 .042 
Soybean Yield (bu/acre) .112 .109 1.025 .310 -.107 .330 
Corn Price ($/bu) -3.100 1.181 -2.625 .011 -5.468 -.732 
Soybean Price ($/bu) 1.287 .565 2.279 .027 .155 2.419 
Commodity Payments (per $10,000) .001 .001 1.417 .162 -.001 .003 
Crop Insurance (per $10,000) .042 .005 7.722 .000 .031 .053 
Northern Region 16.068 1.371 11.723 .000 13.320 18.816 
Central Region -6.641 1.457 -4.558 .000 -9.563 -3.720 
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Southern Region is absent because it is used as the base. 
  
Table 10. Fixed Effect Regression Model 2  
Parameter B Std. Error t Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Intercept 21.689 1.541 14.076 .000 18.602 24.776 
Commodity Payments (per $10,000) .002 .001 1.577 .120 .000 .004 
Crop Insurance (per $10,000) .043 .005 7.991 .000 .032 .053 
Corn Revenue ($/acre) -.012 .005 -2.355 .022 -.022 -.002 
Soybean Revenue ($/acre) .017 .007 2.389 .020 .003 .032 
Northern Region 16.649 1.210 13.763 .000 14.226 19.073 
Central Region -6.063 1.264 -4.796 .000 -8.596 -3.531 
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Table 11. Fixed Effects Regression Model 3 
Parameter B Std. Error t Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Intercept 17.916 4.391 4.080 .000 9.100 26.732 
Corn Yield (bu/acre) .016 .027 .615 .541 -.037 .070 
Soybean Yield (bu/acre) .075 .126 .598 .553 -.177 .328 
Corn Price ($/bu) -3.076 1.256 -2.450 .018 -5.596 -.555 
Soybean Price ($/bu) 1.345 .608 2.211 .032 .124 2.566 
Commodity Payments (per $10,000) .002 .001 1.824 .074 .000 .004 
Crop Insurance (per $10,000) .039 .006 6.553 .000 .027 .051 
Northern Region 15.229 1.497 10.173 .000 12.224 18.235 
Central Region -7.337 1.605 -4.571 .000 -10.559 -4.114 
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Southern Region is absent because it is used as the base. 
  
Table 12. Fixed Effects Regression Model 4  
Parameter B Std. Error t Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Intercept 22.165 1.741 12.731 .000 18.673 25.657 
Commodity Payments (per $10,000) .002 .001 2.081 .042 8.480E-5 .005 
Crop Insurance (per $10,000) .039 .006 6.498 .000 .027 .052 
Corn Revenue ($/acre) -.009 .006 -1.523 .134 -.020 .003 
Soybean Revenue ($/acre) .015 .008 1.895 .064 -.001 .032 
Northern Region 15.934 1.373 11.607 .000 13.181 18.688 
Central Region -6.598 1.452 -4.546 .000 -9.510 -3.687 
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Figure 1: Map of Illinois Regions 
 
Figure 1 shows the Northern, Central, and Southern regions of Illinois used in this study. The 
standard farmdoc reporting regions were overlaid onto a county map of Illinois (Wikimedia 
Commons). The Northern region contains 22 counties, the Central region contains 44 counties, 
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Figure 4: Land Tenure in Central Illinois 
 
Figures 2 through 4 show how the percent usage of cash rent leases, share rent leases, and 
owner operated acres has changed over time throughout the Northern, Central, and Southern 
regions of Illinois in farms using FBFM. From 1995 to 2015, cash rent usage saw an increase 
from 41 to 59 percent (a 44 percent rise) in Northern Illinois, 20 to 41 percent (a 105 percent 
rise) in Southern Illinois, and 18 to 39 percent (a 117 percent rise) in Central Illinois. 
Subsequently, share rent usage has dropped from 42 to 21 percent in Northern Illinois, 58 to 37 
percent in Southern Illinois, and 68 to 46 percent in Central Illinois.  Owner-operated acres have 
remained relatively consistent throughout the same time period (Lattz, 2016; Lattz and Zwilling, 
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CHAPTER III: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Previous studies done by Helmers, Shaik, and Johnson (2005), Blank, Erickson, and 
Hallahan (2012), and Zhang, Zhang, and Hart (2018) have observed factors such as crop yields, 
farm income, and government payments as determinants of land values. Examining factors that 
have been found by previous studies to have effects on both land values and choosing between 
different leases will help develop a better understanding of what drives changes in cash rent 
usage.  
To understand why lease trends are changing so much, we must understand what factors 
affect the land market. Helmers, Shaik, and Johnson (2005) found that cash crop receipts and 
government payments were consistent with income generated from professionally managed 
farmland, meaning that recent cash crop receipts and government payments were strongly 
considered when looking into anticipated level of return off of the rented land. However, cash 
receipts are generally uncertain due to changing markets and they only account for gross revenue 
and not the net revenue. Government payments also have uncertainty due to the nature of 
changes being made to farm programs. Recent returns from crop receipts and government 
payments that farmers have received play a major role in their expectations for the income they 
expect to earn in upcoming years and help them make their decisions going forward (Helmers, 
Shaik, and Johnson, 2005). 
Government payments also have an effect on the value of farmland. Over the years, there 
have been many different Farm Bills that have utilized many different payment types. During the 
time span examined by this study, there were five different Farm Bills used, including the Food, 
Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990; the Federal Agriculture Improvement and 
Reform Act of 1996; the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002; the Food, 
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Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008; and the Agricultural Act of 2014 (National Agricultural 
Law Center, n.d.).  The was also a wide variety of different commodity payments that were 
utilized throughout the years. Some of the major commodity payments used include deficiency 
payments in 1995; production flexibility contracts (1996-2002), loan deficiency payments (1998-
2006), marketing loan gains (1998-2006), and marketing loss assistance (1998-2001) introduced 
in the 1996 Farm Bill; total direct payments (2002-2014) and counter cyclical payments (2003-
2006) from the 2002 Farm Bill; average crop revenue election program (ACRE) (2009-2013) in 
the 2008 Farm Bill; and agricultural risk coverage (ARC) and price loss coverage (PLC) from 
the 2014 Farm Bill (EWG; National Agricultural Law Center, n.d.).  
 Policy changes have implications on both the owner and the operator. While the operator 
may benefit directly from government payments by receiving the money, it also allows for 
landowners to increase the price of cash rents. Land prices were found to be higher when 
payments were issued than they were if no government assistance was given to farmers (USDA-
ERS, 2001). For every dollar of marginal subsidies that are paid out, a 20 to 25 cent increase in 
rental rates can be expected (Kirwan, 2009). Since government payments contribute to income, 
they help boost farmland value in situations where the land has government payments that are 
associated with it. The landowner receives more of the aforementioned value because, in most 
cases, the payment is attached to the land, and land that receives frequent payments is more 
valuable than land that does not (Ryan et al., 2001). When the land is rented using a cash rent 
lease the operator will receive all of the payments.  However, the landowner receives value 
because the cash rent price can be increased since the operator is making more money (Kirwan, 
2015; Lattz, 2017a).  When using a crop share lease, the landowner and the operator will split the 
government payments that are received (Leibold, 2018).  Placing land into conservation 
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programs to receive payments can draw land out of production, which can lead to increased 
rental prices on land still in production (Ryan et al., 2001).   
However, different types of leases can lead to different ways that government payments 
are received by both the landowner and the operator. Much of this has to do with who is 
“actively engaged in farming”. Being actively engaged in farming requires everyone involved to 
provide “significant contributions to the farming operation” (USDA FSA, 2015, p. 1). These 
contributions include things like farmland, labor, management or equipment (USDA FSA, 2015).  
How much money is received through government payments and which programs the 
money comes from can also affect cash rent rates. Roberts, Kirwan, and Hopkins (2003) used 
data from the 1992 and 1997 Census of Agriculture to find that for every dollar of government 
payment, land rental prices increased by 34 to 41 cents in nine regions across the country, 
including the Northern Great Plains and Heartland. Lence and Mishra (2003) found that for each 
dollar of market assistance and production flexibility contracts that was paid out in Iowa from 
1996 to 2000, cash rent prices would increase by 86 cents per acre. Goodwin, Mishra, and 
Ortalo-Magné (2004) used data from the National Agricultural Statistics Service Agricultural 
Resource Management Survey to gather payment data for different farm programs across the 
country from 1998 to 2001. The study discovered that for every dollar of loan deficiency 
payments (LDP), a 57-cent rise in cash rent prices would occur. Lambert and Griffin (2004) 
examined the changes that loan deficiency payments had on cash rent prices in Illinois from 
1996-2001. The study found that no changes in cash rent prices were due to LDPs.  
Another factor that could play a part in changing land values is farm income. In a study 
by Blank, Erickson, and Hallahan (2012) a regression analysis was done on 95,517 observations 
collected from farmers and random farmer samples from 1996-2010 in ten different regions 
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across the U.S. The analysis found that farm income was only significant in affecting farmland 
values in two of ten regions during that time. However, since this was a time of low farm 
income, the authors found it understandable that farm incomes were not driving farmland prices 
at the time. Their regression analysis concluded that farm incomes from production were not the 
main reason for land prices rising for that period. Instead they found that urban influence, such as 
growth of the outskirts of cities, was the most dominate factor (Blank, Erickson, and Hallahan, 
2012).   
Stephens and Schurle (2013) examined additional factors affecting land price swings. 
Specifically, they studied the effect that rainfall had on prices in Western Kansas. Their 
regression results came back with a ninety-five percent confidence level and found that every 
inch of rainfall was worth about $75.30 per acre. Other potential issues that could affect land 
prices are not all land being the same and potential randomness of sales. A prime example of this 
would be a neighbor paying more for farmland because they desperately desire it. They also 
conclude that regression analysis is a very valuable tool that can allow for appraisers to see the 
impacts of many different factors on land sale (Stephens and Schurle, 2013).  
There is also a possible connection to be examined between cash rent values and actual 
land values. Ibendahl and Griffin (2013) looked at whether cash rent prices or land prices were 
the determining factor in setting the market prices for both. They found that cash rent prices will 
follow land prices pretty steadily until land prices start to drop, in which case cash rent prices do 
not drop at the same rate. Some thoughts as to why this occurs are tenants have a large impact on 
changes in cash rent prices. Tenants can affect cash rent prices by both helping slow down 
increases and helping drops in price occur faster. It was also noted that other pressures being 
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placed on land values have an effect on the changes that occur between land and cash rent prices 
(Ibendahl and Griffin, 2013).  
With many other factors such as government payments and risk having been found to 
have effects on cash rent and land price, the effects of corn and soybean yields and prices on land 
prices should be inspected as well. Zhang, Zhang, and Hart (2018) examined how industry 
professionals’ thoughts on future commodity prices affects their predictions of future farmland 
values. The study surveyed farm managers, real estate brokers, rural appraisers and others 
attending the Soil Management and Land Valuation (SMLV) conference at Iowa State University 
to capture their perspectives on future land and commodity prices. They concluded that crop 
price changes and expected land value changes correlate with each other. The correlation was the 
strongest in the medium-term land forecast. They found that a one percent increase in corn prices 
would result in a 0.2 percent increase in land prices in the short term (2016-2017), while a 0.4 
percent increase could be expected in medium-to-long-term land forecasts. It was also found that 
the correlation was stronger between soybean price changes and land price changes, than 
between changes in corn prices and changes in land prices. This could be attributed to the 
increase in soybean acres during the time of the study (Zhang, Zhang, and Hart, 2018).  
Du, Hennessy, and Edwards (2007) found that for every dollar increase in corn price, 
cash rents in Iowa were expected to go up by seventy-nine dollars per acre in the short run, and 
between $109-$114 per acre in the long run. The long run change in price was found to take 
around four years. This study was conducted using data from 1987 to 2005.  
One reason that use of cash rent leases is increasing could be the risk associated with 
using other lease types. Cash rent lease payments see the operator pay the landowner a set fee per 
acre. The operator will then furnish the cost of all inputs on their own. After the growing season 
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concludes, the farmer then receives all the crop off that rented land and sells it to generate a 
return. Variable cash rent leases set a base amount paid per acre, with the potential of a bonus 
rent based upon the productivity of the farm. The determinants of productivity include 
commodity prices and crop yields. If the tenant experiences high yields and prices in the same 
year, then the bonus will kick in and more money will be paid to the landowner per acre. Share 
rent leases involve the landowner and tenant splitting most of the input costs and the crop that 
comes off the land. Input costs would typically include things such as seed, fertilizer, and 
chemical costs amongst others. Typically, a 50/50 split is the most common crop share 
agreement in Illinois. Selling the crop that comes of off the land is how both parties receive 
payment. (Lattz, 2017b; Lattz, n.d.).  Using share rent leases causes a greater income risk for 
landowners, and cash rent lease do not share that same risk (Harwood et al., 1999). The taxation 
on share rent agreements is also different from cash rent agreement. Landowners must pay self-
employment taxes when using share rent agreements (Fukunaga, 2006). Fukunaga and Huffman 
(2009) noted that using a fixed cash rent lease will guarantee the owner a set price per acre, 
which helps mitigate risk. It has also been observed that the older a landlord becomes, the more 
likely the use of a cash rent contract becomes in order to lower the amount of risk. This study 
also found that as a tenant’s total assets increase without an increase in debt, the contract is more 
likely to be cash rent. Also, as the landowner’s farm assets increase, without an increase in debt, 
the contract is more likely to be cash rent because the landowner is less risk averse. This study 
found that risk-sharing plays a major part in the contract that is selected (Fukunaga and Huffman, 
2009).  
Risk sharing also plays a pivotal role in explaining the rise in cash rent lease usage. In 
Illinois, cash rent prices are rising to levels that are very close to the expected return level that a 
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landowner would see from a share rent lease. By doing this, more of the risk is now being shifted 
to the farmer instead of the landowner. Using risk management instruments such as crop 
insurance and advanced marketing strategies are also thought to be some of the reasons for this 
movement towards higher cash rent prices. The authors also noted that crop revenues and low 
interest rates have an impact on changes in cash rent rates as well (Paulson and Schnitkey, 2014).   
Choosing between different types of leasing contracts also has an effect on changes in 
income levels received in Illinois. With a crop share lease there is a level of protection against 
revenue loss, but when using a cash rent lease, the loss risk is higher because it cannot be 
covered entirely by crop insurance (Paulson, Schnitkey, and Sherrick, 2010). It was also noted 
that when utilizing a cash rent lease, as the price per acre of the lease increases, the greater the 
risk of lost income is for the operator. When farms use more cash rent lease at higher prices, they 
become much more likely to experience losses in income (Paulson, 2012).  
Sotomayor, Ellinger, and Barry (2000) conducted a survey of Illinois grain farmers that 
resulted in details on 1,224 leases. Using a probit estimation and a least squares regression, the 
study found what factors were affecting the cash rent versus crop share contract choice and the 
expected level of cash rent prices. It was observed that changes in revenue, soil productivity, 
tract size, non-farm income, length of business relationship between landowner and operator, 
debt-to-asset ratio, net worth, and number and landowners on one farm were all significant in 
choosing between a cash rent and crop share contract. The variables that were found to affect 
cash rent prices include soil productivity, tract size, and net worth.  
The effect of changes in corn and soybean yields must also be considered when 
examining what has increased the use of cash rent leases. Fukunaga and Huffman (2009) found 
that the larger the variation of crop yields on a field, the more likely it becomes that a crop share 
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contract is used to help share the risk. It was also noted that the type of crop that is planted does 
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